The authors of Contested Space (nssaspace.org/contested-space/) are correct to sound the alarm—the space domain is dynamic, deceptive, and increasingly deliberate in how it’s being shaped by peer competitors.
Their message, that the U.S. must act with urgency to protect its freedom of action in orbit, is not abstract—it’s observable.
These realities demand capabilities that support resilience, survivability, denial of benefit, and credible attribution—exactly the deterrence posture Contested Space outlines.
______________________________________
Persistence Is the Prerequisite
for Freedom of Action
______________________________________
The book opens with a simple premise: “Freedom of action in space is a vital national interest.” General B. Chance Saltzman has stated it more operationally: “We must be able to secure the domain, survive threats, and fight back if necessary.”
From where I sit, their insights don’t just resonate, they echo what’s already happening. Whether it’s ambiguous maneuvers in GEO, unexpected repositioning of high-value assets, or deliberate gray-zone activity, the environment is already contested. And it is being contested in ways that demand more than passive awareness.
But securing the domain starts with persistent awareness, not episodic coverage or forensic reconstruction, but a sustained ability to observe and interpret activity as it unfolds.
China’s Shijian21 (SJ21) launched in late October of 2021 to test debris-removal capabilities. The satellite first practiced rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) with its apogee kick motor (AKM) before capturing the target and removing it to the graveyard.
Then, in January of 2022, the Chinese spacecraft executed a complex capture of the defunct, tumbling CompassG2 (Beidou2). The relocation used a ~60 m/s maneuver and occurred during a period of solar exclusion. This provided a real-world test of the ability to maintain custody under constrained conditions. Notably, SJ21 has exhibited renewed activity in the past few weeks by maneuvering into an RPO with SJ25. Many consider this a possible refueling mission (www.wired.com/story/china-jumps-ahead-in-the-race-to-achieve-a-new-kind-of-reuse-in-space/), a move that could enable SJ21 to pursue additional removal or relocation missions.
These events embody the kind of ambiguous, dual-use behavior Contested Space flags as a growing concern: technically impressive, strategically subtle, and difficult to interpret in real time.
____________________________
Deterrence Requires
Speed and Attribution
____________________________
Contested Space makes the case clearly: “Deterrence in space must be based on resilience, survivability, denial of benefit, and attribution.” That last piece—attribution—is too often treated as a policy problem. In practice, it’s a tempo problem.
Artistic rendition of the Shijian21 on-orbit.
Photo is courtesy of Asia Markets If attribution is slow, adversaries learn they can act and reset before that move is identified. They learn the fidelity to call them out without ambiguity is seriously lacking—that ambiguity becomes their sanctuary.
Russia’s LUCH (OLYMP) satellites exemplify this challenge. The original LUCH (OLYMP), launched in 2014, spent years maneuvering near high-value commercial satellites, particularly those operated by Intelsat, maintaining uncoordinated formations as close as 10 kilometers.
.
These prolonged behaviors weren’t acknowledged and weren’t benign. They raised alarms across the commercial space community and among allied governments (aerospace.csis.org/data/unusual-behavior-in-geo-olymp-k/).
1n August of 2024, the original LUCH (OLYMP) closed to within 2 kilometers of Intelsat-37E. In December, LUCH (OLYMP) 2, launched in March of 2023, employed an identical maneuver with Intelsat 1002, coming within 3 kilometers.
These are not fleeting encounters. They are deliberate, prolonged formations that raise the prospect of surveillance, signals collection, or prepositioning for counterspace missions.
These actions reflect precisely the gray-zone, reversible behavior Contested Space identifies as destabilizing: operationally ambiguous, politically deniable, and technically difficult to characterize without persistent, high-accuracy Space Domain Awareness (SDA).
____________________________
SDA Is What Enables
Decision Advantage
____________________________
General Stephen Whiting has said, “SDA is foundational to every mission we conduct in, from, and to space.” Contested Space extends that by emphasizing that strategic advantage flows from the ability to decide faster and more confidently than the adversary.
Artistic rendition of Russia’s LUCH satellite on-orbit.
That doesn’t just mean knowing where things are. It means understanding what they’re doing, what they’ve done, and what might come next.
We’ve seen that when awareness is sustained and responsive, decision-makers can operate with tempo. They can respond to maneuvers within hours—not days. They can characterize intent, not just location.
When decisions are informed by persistent, real-time, and reliable data, the fog begins to lift. Strategic ambiguity gives way to operational clarity. That’s how you generate decision advantage, by staying inside the adversary’s OODA (observe, orient, decide, act)loop and forcing them to operate at a tempo they can’t match.
___________________________________
Intelsat-33E: A Live-Fire
Test for SDA in the GEO Belt
___________________________________
In October of 2024, Intelsat 33E suffered a catastrophic on-orbit anomaly in geostationary orbit (GEO). Previous GEO events—AMC9, TELKOM1, and Intelsat 29E—produced debris, but IS33E was different. It released hundreds of trackable fragments—an unprecedented scale of debris for a single satellite in GEO.
Resolving the full scope of the debris field required coordinated multi-site observations, fused tracking data, and days of sustained analysis to confirm object separations and safeguard nearby assets.
That incident crystallizes the lesson from Contested Space: “In the absence of verifiable attribution, escalation risks rise.” The ability to maintain persistent, credible observation isn’t academic—it’s a shield against misjudgment.
As General B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, warned earlier this year: “The first shots in a future conflict could be in or through space.”
Major General Paul Tedman, Commander of UK Space Command, echoed the same concern, stating, “Britain’s next war is ‘highly likely’ to begin in space.” Events such as IS33E show what those opening moments might look like—and why we must be ready to interpret them before the world reacts.
___________________________________________
Norms and Legitimacy Depend on
What You Can See and Prove
___________________________________________
Scott Pace’s chapter reminds us that international law still governs space, and that escalation control depends on distinguishing hostile intent from incidental behavior. But that distinction only exists if you can prove it.
Norms only stabilize behavior when violations are visible. Legitimacy only restrains escalation when attribution is credible. SDA isn’t just a military tool—SDA is a strategic stabilizer. In this sense, SDA enables both deterrence and diplomacy.
___________________________________________________________
Commercial Integration Is Already Happening
It Needs Recognition, Not Reinvention
___________________________________________________________
The call in Contested Space for deeper commercial integration is welcome—and accurate. But from the inside, it’s also incomplete. Commercial systems are not waiting to be invited—they’re already operating. The challenge is not introducing commercial capability but institutionalizing it.
Too often, operationally proven capabilities exist outside programmatic pathways. They support national security missions, but without the same visibility or recognition. That creates risk. Because in a future crisis, we’ll depend on what’s already fielded—not what’s still in planning.
Hybrid architectures are not a policy preference—they’re an operational reality. The sooner we normalize that reality across acquisition, resourcing, and planning, the better prepared we’ll be.
___________________________________________________
Conclusion: Aligning Insight with Action
___________________________________________________
The strategic picture in Contested Space is clear. Its diagnosis is urgent. What’s needed now is the operational continuity to carry that urgency forward—through integration, readiness, and persistent awareness.
From the operator’s perspective, contested space is not an emerging condition. It is the daily baseline. The behaviors described in the book—RPOs, gray-zone activity, capability signaling through maneuver—aren’t future threats. They’re recent events.
Space domain awareness is not an accessory to Space Power. It is what allows freedom of action to exist at all. And, as the space environment continues to evolve (often in quiet, subtle ways), our ability to detect, interpret, and respond will determine not only what we can do in orbit, but whether we can act at all.
exoanalytic.com
Clinton Clark
Clinton Clark serves as Chief Growth Officer and vice president of First Impressions at ExoAnalytic Solutions. He is responsible for communicating Exo’s vision and values to the world while driving the sales and growth of the company. His passion is the creative application of technology to address critical national security space issues including space domain awareness, missile defense, missile warning, and position, navigation, and timing. His responsibilities at ExoAnalytic also include product and service development, operations research and analysis support to multiple customers, and the evaluation of operational utility of advanced technology solutions.
Mr. Clark is a customer-focused operations researcher with deep expertise in the application of structured decision-making techniques, multivariate statistics, and modeling and simulation to a variety of problem areas. Clinton holds degrees from Lamar University, Rice University, and the Air Force Institute of Technology.